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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TUMURRU TRADES, INC. , : 
Pe t i t ioner /P la in t i f f , : 
v . ; 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ; 
Respondent/Defendant. : 
Appeal No. 89 -0209 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The act by a single taxpayer of taking the items out of 
inventory for use by the same taxpayer in a construction contract 
does not constitute a retail sale for the purpose of sales tax. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 19, 1990, this Court filed its Opinion in 
response to the Petitioner/Plaintiff's Appeal From Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
By this Petition for Rehearing, Petitioner/Plaintiff 
("Tumurru") requests the Court reconsider and rehear a portion of 
its Opinion dated September 19, 1990. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
The sole question presented in this Petition for Rehearing 
concerns the portion of the Opinion of the Court set forth on the 
top of page 8 which reads as follows: 
"In the instant case, the seller was Tumurru and the 
buyer was the contracting arm of Tumurru. The act of 
taking the items out of inventory for use in a 
construction contract is a retail sale for the purpose of 
sales tax because the contractor is the ultimate 
consumer, Tumurru was not obligated by any contract to 
may physical delivery across state boundaries to its own 
contracting arm, and Tumurru's contracting arm took 
possession and title to the items in Utah. Tumurru is 
therefore liable for the sales tax due on those items 
sold to its contracting entity for use in out-of-state 
construction projects. . . . " (underscoring added) 
We believe the question presented in this portion of the 
Opinion is worthy of reconsideration by the Court inasmuch as the 
question involves a basic concept in taxation, that is, whether a 
single taxpayer, Tumurru in this case, creates a 'taxable event' by 
making an internal administrative decision to use a particular part 
of its inventory for a specific purpose. 
This question was discussed in detail in the Reply Brief for 
the Petitioner. A portion of the Reply Brief for the Petitioner 
provides as follows: 
"Building materials purchased by Tumurru were not 
subject to sales or use tax at the time of purchase from 
a vendor under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102 and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103, exempting from sales 
or use tax purchases for resale. 
In Levine v. State Bd. of Equalization of the State 
of California, 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1956) the court outlined the rationale for this rule as 
follows: 
"There are many situations which develop in the 
ordinary course of business where the purchaser is 
unable to determine at the time of the purchase whether 
he will in fact resell the articles purchased or will 
2 
use them. The resale certificate provisions of the law 
were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under 
these circumstances until such time as the ultimate 
disposition of the property is determined. If that 
disposition is a resale, in the form of tangible 
personal property, then no tax is due with respect to 
the original sale. If that disposition is for a use 
other than retention, demonstration, or display, while 
holding it for sale in the regular course of business, 
then a tax is due because the property was not purchased 
for resale. ..." 
The Court has held that an administrative 
determination by Tumurru that it would use building 
materials purchased in Utah, then on hand and then 
located in Utah, constitutes a sale, utilization or 
conversion of the building materials to or with itself 
thus obligating Tumurru to pay sales tax at the time of 
such administrative determination. 
The Court also held that such an administrative 
determination, as a matter of law, is a transfer within 
Utah. 
Tumurru suggests that such an administrative 
determination by Tumurru does not result in the ultimate 
use or conversion of the building materials and is not a 
sale, exchange or other disposition of the property and 
that no sale, exchange or other disposition of the 
property occurs until the (1) transfer of title and/or 
physical possession to an outside purchaser, or (2) 
actual physical utilization of the property in the 
construction of the real property improvements." 
Counsel has reviewed Federal income tax law, state income tax 
law and sales and use tax law and can find no decisions or other 
authority which would support the decision of the Court to the 
effect that "The act of taking the items out of inventory by a 
single taxpayer for use by the same taxpayer in a construction 
contract is a retail sale for the purpose of the sales tax . . ." 
Taxable events do not occur until there is some transaction 
wherein title is transferred to another taxpayer. 
If the law is as suggested by the Court in this case, the 
administrative difficulties in administrating the tax laws would be 
3 
insurmountable since each taxpayer would be required to keep its 
books and file its tax returns on the basis of day to day 
administrative decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth in 
the Reply Brief for the Petitioner/Plaintiff, Tumurru respectfully 
requests the Court rehear and reargue this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 1990. 
J f$KT BOLLOCK, ESQ. 
COUNSELLOR PETITIONER 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TUMMURRU TRADES, INC. , : 
Pe t i t i one r /P l a in t i f f , \ 
V . ! 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION ; 
Resporrient/Defendaoit. 
Appeal No. 89-0209 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT 
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) , 
effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not 
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax 
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
2. Sales or use tax is not due from Tummurru merely by an 
administrative determination by Tummurru that building materials 
owned by Tummurru and located within Utah will be used in the 
construction of out-of-state real property improvements or will be 
used by Tummurru in the construction of components to be used in 
the construction of out-of-state real property improvements. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(34)(1989), 
effective July 1/ 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not 
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax 
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
1 
The amendment of the statute described in Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), cited by Respondent/Defendant reflected 
a change in the law which the legislature could have enacted at any 
time, without any constitutional limitations. 
The change in the law in Madsen, supra, related to charges in 
the law relating to suits brought against state employees for 
actions taken in the course of their employment and did not involve 
constitutional limitations. 
The Commission is presumably arguing that the enactment of a 
statute by the legislature creating a rule of law which could have 
been or is not constitutional, creates, by legislative enactment, 
a presumption that the rule was constitutional prior to the 
enactment of the statute. 
Tummurru submits there is no authority for such an argument. 
To the contrary, whether a rule of law (i.e. in this case relating 
to sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated 
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property 
located outside of this state) is or is not constitutional will be 
determined on its own merits. 
2. A sale subject to sales or use tax is not created by the 
determination by Tummurru that building materials located within 
Utah will be used in the construction of out-of-state real property 
improvements or will be used by Tummurru in the construction of 
components to be used in the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
Building materials purchased by Tummurru were not subject to 
sales or use tax at the time of purchase from a vendor under the 
2 
provis ions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103, exempting from sa les or use tax purchases for r e s a l e . 
In Levine v. State Bd. of Equalizat ion of the S ta te of 
Ca l i fo rn ia , 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. Dis t . Ct. App. 1956) the court 
out l ined the ra t iona le for t h i s ru l e as follows: 
"There are many situations which develop in the ordinary 
course of business where the purchaser is unable to determine at the 
time of the purchase whether he will in fact resell the articles 
purchased or will use them. The resale certificate provisions of 
the law were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under 
these circumstances until such time as the ultimate disposition of 
the property is determined. If that disposition is a resale, in the 
form of tangible personal property, then no tax is due with respect 
to the original sale. If that disposition is for a use other than 
retention, demonstration, or display, while holding i t for sale in 
the regular course of business, then a tax is due because the 
property was not purchased for resale. . . . " 
The Commission presumably argues in i t s Brief (p.19) tha t an 
admin is t ra t ive determination by Tummurru t h a t i t would use bui lding 
mate r i a l s purchased in Utah, then on hand and then located in Utah, 
c o n s t i t u t e s a sa le , u t i l i z a t i o n or conversion of the bui lding 
ma te r i a l s t o or with i t s e l f thus ob l iga t ing Tummurru to pay sa les 
tax a t the time of such adminis t ra t ive determination. 
The Commission also presumably argues tha t such an 
admin is t ra t ive determination, as a matter of law, i s a " t i t l e 1 1 
t r a n s f e r within Utah ( i . e . in P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f ' s br ief , "The 
sa l e between Tummurru, as a Utah wholesaler, and Tummurru, as a 
general cont rac tor , with t i t l e t r an s f e r r i ng in Utah). 
Tummurru suggests t ha t such an adminis t ra t ive determination 
by Tummurru does not r e s u l t in the u l t imate use or conversion of 
the bui ld ing materials and i s not a s a l e , exchange or other 
d i spos i t i on of the property and t h a t no s a l e , exchange or other 
d i spos i t i on of the property occurs u n t i l the (1) t r ans fe r of t i t l e 
3 
and/or physica l possession t o an outs ide purchaser, or (2) ac tual 
physical u t i l i z a t i o n of the property in the construct ion of the 
rea l proper ty improvements. 
The f ac t s in Levinef supra, are c l e a r l y d i s t ingu ishab le from 
those in the in s t an t case as follows: 
a. In Levine, supra, t he actual physical assembly of the 
property occurred within the s t a t e . In t h i s case, the actual 
physical assembly occurred without the s t a t e . 
b . In Levine, supra, t he property was always tangib le 
personal property and never became r e a l property, unless , for 
example, by a specif ic contrac t between the purchaser- lessee and a 
l e s so r . In t h i s case, in a l l instances the property did u l t imate ly 
became r e a l property and became rea l property without the s t a t e of 
Utah. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For a l l of t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , and f o r t h o s e s e t f o r t h i n 
t h e B r i e f f o r t h e P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f , t h e P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f , 
Tummurru T r a d e s , I n c . , r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e 
Utah S t a t e Tax Commission s h o u l d be r e v e r s e d . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 11 th day of May, 1990 . 
)CK, ESQ. 
FOR PETITIONER 
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130 State Capitol 
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Attorneys for 
Utah State Tax Commission 
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It is argued that the trial court commit-
ted error and was guilty of misconduct in 
that he told the jury that the overt acts 
were "good overt acts". However, exami-
nation of the court's instruction in this 
connection shows that the court did not 
instruct the jury that the overt acts were 
good overt acts but stated that overt acts 
proven were "good overt acts". 
[22] Other complaints of appellant as 
to the instructions given are likewise with-
out merit. It further appears that many of 
the instructions offered by appellant were 
covered by other instructions or did not 
accurately state the law and no prejudicial 
error resulted from the refusal to give 
them. 
[23] Finally, appellant contends that 
the court erred by invading the province of 
the jury during its deliberations. No error 
appears in this connection. The jury dur-
ing its deliberations reir.rned to court for 
further instructions and at the request of 
a juror, the court reread a portion of the 
instructions given relative to the question 
of the liability of persons charged with a 
conspiracy for the acts and declarations 
of persons not members of such conspiracy. 
The court then informed the jury that a 
person who committed a criminal act with-
out having knowledge of a conspiracy 
would not be guilty thereof. It appears 
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed 
on the law applicable to the charges set 
forth in the indictment and that the court 
did not invade the province of the jury 
during its deliberations. 
In view of what we have heretofore said. 
we deem it unnecessary to pass on other 
points raised by appellant. 
The judgment and order denying motion 
for new trial are affirmed. 
BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN. J., 
concur. 
Hyman LEVINE and Emma Levlne, limited 
partner*, Isidore Levlne, Sidney Rose and 
Sid B. Levlne, genera! partner*, doing busi-
ness under the firm names of Santa Ft 
Tank 4 Tower Company, Division at In-
dustrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and Acme 
Tank Manufacturing Company, Division of 
Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a limited 
partnership, and Manny A. Rose, Plain-
tiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the 
State of California, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Hyman LEVINE and Emma Levlne, limited 
partners, Isidore Levlne, Freda Levlne, Sid* 
ney Rose and Sid B. Levine, general part-
ners, doing business under the firm tames 
of Santa Fe Tank & Tower Company, Divi-
sion of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and 
Acme Tank Manufacturing Company, Dlvi. 
sion of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd.. a 
limited partnership, and Manny A. Rose. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the 
State of California. Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Civ. 21314, 21315. 
District Court of Appeal. Second District. 
Division 1. California 
July 3, 195G. 
Rehearing Denied July 30. 2956. 
Hearing Denied Auc 30. 303C. 
Two actions for recovery of taxes lev-
ied and collected under Sales and Use Tax 
Law. The cases were consolidated for trial 
in the Superior Court. Los Angeles County, 
Ellsworth Meyer, J., and judgment in each 
case went for the defendant State Board 
of Equalization. Appeal.- were taken from 
the judgments and the District Court of 
Appeal, Foun, J., held that where pur-
chasers of materials entered into construc-
tion contracts to fabricate and erect struc-
tures on real property out of state. thc\ 
were essentially performing services :m<! 
were consumers of the materials which 
they had purchased and were not encased 
in the reselling of materials as persona1 
property. 
Affirmed. 
LEVINE ?. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION Ca). 7 3 9 
cue at :*s P.20 : n 
Ann.Rcv. & Tax Code, §§ 6009.1, 6031, I. Licenses G=>I5I(6) 
Under Saks and Use Tax Law as in 6091-6094 
< t u n before 1953 amendments, materials 
purchased by California seller under cer-
tificates of resale and subsequently fab-
ricated, shipped and erected on out-of-state 
.iob sites pursuant to contracts with out-of-
Ntatc purchasers were subject to the tax. 
West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1, 
<>0:1, 6ro 1-6094, 6201 
2. Commerce C=>$4 
Licenses C=>I5.»(6) 
W here materials were purchased by 
California seller under certificates of re-
sale and subsequently fabricated, shipped 
and erected on out-of-state job sites pur-
suant to contract with out-of-state pur-
S. Licenses C=>32(l) 
Resale certificate provisions of Sales 
and Use Tax Law were enacted to permit 
purchase to be tax free, where purchaser 
is unable to determine at time of purchase 
whether he will in fact resell articles pur-
chased or will use them, until such time as 
ultimate disposition of property is deter-
mined. West's Ann.Rev. L Tax.Code, §§ 
6091-6094. 
6. Commerce C=>64 
Licenses C=l5.i(6) 
Subjection to imposition of taxes un-
der Sales and Use Tax Law of purchases of 
materials, purchased by contractors who 
chasers, such sales to California seller were
 ? a v e r e s a j e certificates and then subse-
not exempt from sales and use taxes by vir-
 q u e n t ] v fabricated items which they instali-
tue of statute relating to property exempted
 e d o n out-of-state job sites, did not conflict 
by Constitution or federal law, nor was state
 W l l h T m e r s t a t e Commerce Clause of federal 
Constitution, nor was extraterritorial effect 
thereby given to the Sales and Use Tax 
Law. West's Ann Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 
60:>9 1. 6053, 6091-6094; U.S.C.A.Const, art. 
1, § S, cl. 3. 
7. Licenses C=>28 
Purpose of resale provisions of Sales 
and Use Tax Law is to relieve original 
fabricated pursuant to contracts and erected seller from payment of sale? tax where 
deprived of jurisdiction to collect tax by 
virtue of Interstate Commerce Clause of 
federal Constitution. West's Ann.Rev. & 
Tax.Code. § 6352; U.S.C.A.Const, art. 1, 
§ S, cl. 3. 
3. Licenses C=M5.I(3) 
Partners engaged in business of con-
structing tanks and other items which were 
TLO. ^.i property outside the- state were, 
ur.di: factr as shown by the record, ''con-
tractors" within meaning of law of Cali-
fornia, and were "consumers" for sales and 
use tax purposes. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax. 
Code. §§ 6'JOQ.L 6051. 6091-6094. 
Set publication Words and Phrases, 
for otbrr judicial construction* nrttl «i'fi-
niuous of "'Consumers*' and "Contrac-
tors*'. 
4. Estoppel C=>92(l) 
Where contractors in bi:s:ncss of fab-
ricating items avoided immediate payment 
of sale- taxes on purchases of materials by 
sivins resale certificates as provided by 
statute, they had no standing to attempt 
in court to avoid condition.- specified in 
*nch statute, by reference to other statutes 
property is bought b\ purchaser for purpose 
of reselling it in form of tangible personal 
property. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax Code, 
§£ 6091-6095. 
8. Licenses C=M5.I(8) 
Legislature did not intend to permit 
purchasers to escape entirely, payment of 
tax under Sales and Use Tax Lav* b\ giv-
ing of resale certificate if it later de\ el-
oped that property wa> consumed or used 
rather than resold m form of tangible per-
sonal property, and. to prevent th:> possibil-
ity, Legislature enacted section relating t«» 
the USL of article bought for resale. \\ est's 
Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6091-6095. 
\Yadcworth & Frascr, by E. L. Fraser, 
bv charges of inconsistency. West's Los Angeles, for appellants. 
740 Cal. » 9 PACIFIC BEPOETER, t d SERIES 
Edmund G Brown, Att\. Gen., James E. 
Si:-.iH, A>-t Att\ Gen. Edward Sumner, 
Da-. Kaufmann, and Janus C. Maupin, 
IX put} Att; s. Gen., lor respondent. 
FOURT. lusi.ee. 
Appellants brought two actions for the 
rcc:\er> of taxes lc\icd and collected un-
der the California Sales and Use Tax Law. 
The cases were consolidated for trial and 
judgment in each case went for the defend-
a n t 
One action, Case Number 21314, is for 
the recovery of taxes in the amount of S°.-
717.17, with interest levied during the- peri-
od from February 1, 1949, to September 30, 
1951. The second action, Case Number 
21315, is for the recovery of taxes in the 
SUE of $1,9-40 18, with interest levied dur-
ing the period from July 1, 1948, to January 
31, 1949. Except for the taxable periods 
the legal and factual issues in each action 
are substantial!} the *ame 
The appellants were engaged in design-
ing, enginet^.ng, fabricating, selling and 
installing water cooling tewcrs, aerial tow-
ers and industrial wooden products es-
pecial'y des gned for industrial processing 
Tr.r business headquarters were Heated m 
Les Angeles, and their principal fabricating 
p*anr, storage and lumber yard were lo-
cated at Sa r ta Rosa, California Cus-
tomers' purchase orders were fir«t «en: to 
thr Los Angeles ofrkt where design and 
e~s\r.eenng work was performed The or-
ders were then forwarded to S.jua JvDsa. 
accompanied by requisitions to m\enijr \ 
Fabrication and loading for shipment were 
I. K ^ c n n f and Taxnt.or Cod^ vrf-r.'»n« 
"ji lKK"*l What DO: IIK\.IC< d m '-t*»r-
njrc' or "r.s^ ' 'Stomp*' anr! 'd«' d" i;««t 
include tl." k^rpmz. retain n~ or c ^ r -
ri^ii)^ ar; richt or po*f>r i .wr trui^iMo 
pe-^nna! prupcrt> shipped or bro ivut 
into tlu^ >: itt f*»r th»- purpM-^- of *u* *>•-
qiiPBtl; transporting it mi'Mdr th'* Si !•» 
for use thereafter $")'!> out vide the 
State , or for the p u r p l e of b<Mni! pr«>-
erNv»'d. f.i^ricntcd. or m.iTnf.i«*tur.-«l m-
to, atrn'-b»'d to or ineo-por it«*d into. oth«r 
tanpibU- personal prop, m ro bv trans-
ported outside the State and thereafter 
used sole1) outside the State." 
p.rfurmed at Santa Rosa The items fab-
ricked were cither (1) sold and mere1} di 
In t red to the job sites sperfied b} cus-
tomers, or (2) erected on the customers* joi» 
sites b\ appellants Out-of-state shipment* 
were made by railroad car with appellant-
as consignee at the out-of-state job site. 
Appellants' erection superintendent touk 
possession of the shipment upon arrnal 
and with the ass.stance of local labor super-
vised the erection work. No deficiency trr; 
assessments were made upon out-of-^:a:-
sales not involving erection. The bt:Mius» 
was a specialty in that the items fabri-
cated consisted almost entirely of item^ 
specifically engineered for a particular cus-
tomer. 
The instant appeals involve tax and in-
terest measured by the pnee paid by appel-
lants for materials which were purchased 
ID California, ex tax under resale ccrtifi-
cates The raw materia'- were first pViced 
in in\entory in California and, as orders 
were recened for the erecton of one of 
the completed structures to be manufactured 
and installed b\ appJVits , after the de-
sign and er.gmeenng v.urk was done, the 
r.icersary raw materials were withdrawn 
fr^r~ inventor} a^  n c i r u d . and fahncat^d 
sn California for subrcqu.nt cectiun and 
installation by the appellant- outs- L Cai -
fcrnia on customers' jo*« sitec Th-, pur-
chase, storage and fabriCi.t'C- of the rr. -. 
tenia's all took piace in this state. 
\W are concerned with the prevision*- of 
the law as it existed during the tax. Me pe-
riods * 
"> f>r.l Iu:T»"SiTiOr *"id r.ix- of t ' x 
r« * tlit* prnib z> of S' 'i :.z *. • .TJ .]• pt r-
s.-r '! p-oporr\ .it n-! . I L T
 4\ i* !»»»t• !•-. 
«::pi»^»-ti up":; nil rct.ii!» r« c; t) o r-i:« <»f 
2l~j percent of th» ?r»i«s ri'«.j .ts «»; 
ai.> retailer from the .^d< i»f .»!] t.n:^.l» « 
personal p r o p r m «»oM a; r- r i! in \ n^ 
St.it'1 on or nfi'-r Ann:-* 1. ] ^ * ^ . a i d to 
and luHudm? JUDP :I0. M»T>. and at tl»» 
rate of o percent thvrt.*ftrr. and at \u-
r.it" of 2\2 pcret-nt ot. and ::fti-r . luh 
1. 1!1-J.^ . and to and ii»<-]i3'! vg Jnn* .'Ju. 
V-lV.K and at the rate of o p» re^nt there-
a f ter / ' 
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In 1953, section 6010.1 waj amended by chastr m.\\ elect to include in his gn-ss re-
ftrikinc therefrom (he word* "shipped or ccipts the amour: of the rental charged 
brought into this State". In the same year, rather than the cost sales price of the 
fccciion 6094 was amended as follows: property to him.M (Italics indicating addi-
"5 (>0.M. If a purchaser who gives a tions made to the section.) 
certificate makes any use of the property 
othvr than retention, demonstration, or cis-
\ \ here the purchaser gave a valid re-
sale certificate pursuant to sections 6091-
piay while holding it for sale in the reg- 6093, and the gross receipts involved were 
tilar course of business, the use shall be accordingly not included in the measure of 
deemed a retail sale by tc.rablc to the pur- the sales tax imposed upon the vendor, any 
chaser under Chapter 3 of this part as of use by the purchaser other than mere n -
the time the property is first used by him, tention, demonstration or display while 
and the cost soles price of the property to holding the property for sale in the regular 
him shall be deemed the gross receipts from course of business was under section 6094 as 
such retail sale the measure of the tax. it read during the period involved herein. 
Only when there is an unsatisfied use tax and prior to the section's amendment in 
liability on this basis shall the seller be 1953, deemed a retail sale by the purchaser 
liable for sales tax with respect to the sale and subject to the sales tax measured by 
cf the property to the purchaser. If the the purchaser's cost. The amendment of 
sole use of the property other than reten- 1953 provided that the use of tangible per-
tion, demonstration, or display in the reg- sonal property, other than retention, dem-
ular course of business is the rental of the onstration or display, for sale in the reg-
property while holding it for sale, the pur- ular course of business by the one who pur-
**f G091. Presumption that gross re-
ceipts subject to tax: Burden of proof. 
F«»r the purpose of th ' proper adminis-
tration of this part and to prevent eva-
sion of the sales t a i it shall be presumed 
that all gross receipts are subject ?<"> th* 
t a i until thf- contrary is established. 
Tin~ burden of proving that a sale of 
tangibb- persona! property is not a sale 
at retail is upon the person who makes 
thf sale unless be take> from the pur-
chaser a certificate to the effect that the 
property is purchased for resale."* 
"£ C002. Purchaser's certificate that 
pun-has' ' for resale: Sufficiency TO re-
lieve seller of burden of proof. T1K cer-
tificate relieves the seller from the burdeD 
of proof only if taken in good faith from 
a person who is enpaged in the bus icss 
of sellinc tangible personal property and 
who bold? the permit provided for in 
Article 2 of this chapter and who, at 
the time of purchasing th* tangible p* r-
Fonal property, intf-nds to s« 11 it in the 
regular course of business or iv unabh to 
ascertain at the time of purrhasr wlu-ih^r 
?b'- property will be sold or will be used 
for s'>nir other purpose." 
•*$ (jit)'.]. .Same: Execution, form, and 
contents. The certificate *»h.-ill be signed 
by and boar the name and address of the 
purchaser, shall indicate thr number of 
thp permit issued to the purchaser, and 
shall indicate the general character of 
the tangible personal property sold by the 
purchaser in the regular course of busi-
ness. The certificate shah be substan-
tially in such form as the board ma\ pre-
scribe.** 
"§ i'.004. Effect of using article bought 
for resale. If a purchaser who frxes a 
certificate mak«.'s any use of the property 
other than rer^rtioD, demonstration, or 
display while holding it for sale in the 
regular course of business, the use shall 
be deemed a retail sale by the purchaser 
as of the rim' the property is first used 
by b.m. and th- cost of the property to 
him shall be de- meri the gropv r»-e> ipts 
from such rerail sale. If the s<.»b- use 
of the prop«r:y other than retention, 
demonstration, or display in the regular 
course of buv:ne«^ is the rental of vhe 
property whiie holding it for sale, the 
purchaser mar elect to includ in hi* 
gross receipts tbe amount of th* rental 
c h a r e d rather than the cost of the prop-
erty T-. him." 
"$ <»J03. Imposition ani rate of tax. 
An rxris- tax is hereby in.posed on the 
stnragi. use. or oih'-r confirm; hm m this 
Stan- of tangible persona! property pur-
chased from any retailor on r»r aftrr July 
1. VX'~), for str>rage. use. or oth» r con-
Furnption in this State at the rate of 3 por-
ccnt of the sales price of the pr«.p» rry, 
and at the rate nf 21? percent or- and 
after July 3. 3H-J3. and to and including 
June 30, 1940. and at the rate of 3 per 
cent thereafter.*' 
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chased the property under a valid retail 
certificate is subject to the use tax imposed 
by section 6201, rather than the sales tax 
imposed by section 6051. 
During the times with which we are con-
cerned, section 1921 of the California Ad-
ministrative Code, relating to the Board of 
Equalization—Sales and Use Tax (being 
formerly known as Board of Equaliza-
tion Sales and Use Tax Ruling No. 11), pro-
vided in substance as is set forth in the foot-
note hereto.5 
[1] Appellants' contention, in substance, 
is that prior to the 1953 amendment, the 
Sales and Use Tax Law was ambiguous 
with respect to the taxation of materials 
purchased by a California seller under cer-
tificates of resale and subsequently fabri-
cated, shipped and erected on out-of-state 
job sites pursuant to contract with out-of-
state purchasers, and that the 1953 amend-
ments to sections 6009.1 and 6094 should be 
construed as declaration of existing law. 
Before the 1953 amendment, section 
6009.1 exempted from the definition of tax-
able storage and use, under certain cir-
cumstances, only the use of tangible per-
sonal property "shipped or brought into this 
State for the purpose of subsequently trans-
porting it outside the State for use there-
after solely outside the State, » * *." 
In the case of People v. Graze, 13$ Cal. 
App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957, 9c»0\ the court 
said: 
2. The term "Contractor*" as used ID this 
administrative ruling is defined as includ-
ing both general contractors and subcon-
tractors and including also contractors 
engaged in such building trades ns car-
pentry, bricklaying, cement work, steel 
work, plastering, sheet in»*tal work, roof-
ing, tile and terrazzo work, electrical 
work, plumbing, hunting, air ''onmtionmg, 
painting and interior dcc<»rai;ng. 
The term "Oon»truction Contracts" is 
defined as a contract f«»r rrrciing a build-
ing or other structures on land and in-
cludes lump-sum. cost-plus and time-and-
material contract^. 
The term "Material*" is d'finrd as 
tangible personal property which, when 
combined with other tangible personal 
property loses its identity to become an 
"Respondent argues that it has never been 
the intent or effect of the code provisions 
to tax the transactions here involved am! 
refers us to the declaration to that effect 
by the legislature when it passed the ex-
clusionary section 6019. If the existing 
law taxed these transactions, and we hold 
that it did, then the legislature could not 
change the law by declaring that it had 
never intended to tax them. 
" The usual purpose of a special interpre-
tative statute is to correct a judicial inter-
pretation of a prior law which the Legis-
lature determines to be inaccurate. Where 
such statutes are given any effect, the effect 
is prospective only. This seems correct, for 
any other result would make the Legislature 
a court of last resort.' (2 Sutherland Stat-
utory Construction, third edition, sec. 3004.) 
"In any event the legislature could not 
retroactively change what had been the 
law by declaring what a preceding legis-
lature had meant by what it had said." See, 
also, Stockton Savings & Loan Bank v. 
Massanet. 18 CaL2d 200, 114 P.2d 592; 
Board of Social Welfare v. County o^ L. A., 
27 Cal .2d 90. 162 P.2d 655; California Em-
ployment Stabilization Comm. v. Payne, 31 
Ck}.2d 210, 187 P.2d 702. 
[2] The appellant further contends that 
the imposition of the tax violates the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. The initial sale? and purchases of 
the material? b\ thi appellants were sub-
ject to a sales tax in that the property was 
integral and inseparable part of the com-
pleied structure. The ruling contains a 
list of "materials'* such as flooring, in-
sulation, hubs. lumber, oil. paint, piping, 
valves, pipelining, putt;.• roofing, sheet 
metal, si*•«•!. vaHtRiard, *ea:b» r>:ripping. 
vin»d prr»s«*rvfr. ere. 
The term "Kixturfs" is defined a* items 
aevrssory to a building and which do not 
lose their identity as accessaries when 
placed
 (,r iiis::ilii'd. such as bghLing fix-
ture , et<\ 
The ruling specifically provides in sub-
division <b> (3 that "Contractors are 
tb^ <HitiM;i:nTy of materials useJ by them 
in fulfilling r»»n«:ruction contracts and 
th«« tax :ipt>li"s to the sale of such ma-
terial* to the contractors." 
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delivered to appellants at a point in the the purchase to be ta.x free under these 
state. Such sales were no; exempt under circumstances until such time as the ulti-
section 6352 of the Re\cnue and Taxation mate disposition of the property is dctcr-
Codc, nor was the state deprived of juris- mined. If that disposition is a resale, in 
diction to collect the tax by virtue of the the form of tangible personal property, 
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal then no tax is due with respect to the ong-
Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. inal sale. If that disposition is for a use 
[3] The appellants were cr.capcd in the o t h e r t h a n Mention, demonstration, or dis-
busmess of constructing tanks and the items *>]a>"' w h l ] c h o l d l ^ « f o r - a l * i n l h c r c ? u l a r 
heretofore mentioned, which were fabri- c o u r s e o f business, then a tax is due bc-
cated pursuant to contracts to be erected c a n s c t h e P roPcr t> w a 5 n o t purchased for 
on real property outside of the state. In resale. However, under these circumstanc-
our opinion they were, under the facts of c s ' t h e P c r s o n w h o S a v e t h e r « a , c c £ r t l f i ; 
these particular cases, contractors within cate is required to pay a tax at the rate of 
the meaning of the law of this state, and t h e 5 a , c s t a x ' b u t ">c«ured by the cost of 
were consumers. It was ssid in General t h e _ p r o p t r t - v t 0 h , r a T h e ' ^ s l a t u r e appar-
Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
111 Cal.App.2d ISO, 1S7, 244 P.2d 427, 431: 
" * * * Where the materials are com-
bined with other materials so as to lose 
their identity and become part of the com-
pleted structure the contractor is deemed 
to be the consumer of such materials 
* » * » 
[4] But for the giving of resale cer-
tificates, the sales tax would have applied at 
the time of the sale of the raw materials to 
the appellants. By giving: the resale certi-
ficates appellants escapee reimbursing their 
sellers for the sales tax a: the time of the 
initial purchases and sales Such certifi-
cates relieved the seller of tl~u obligation 
initially to pay the sales tax* ar d thus there 
was nonnecessity for the sc!\rs to collect 
sales tax reimbursement tror 
as buyers. Having electvj 
conditions of Article 3, Cha: 
2 of the Revenue and Tax a 
tions 6091-6095, relative to 
cates, the appellants arc :r. 
attempt to avoid the cond:t:: 
tick by reference to ot 
the Code and bv c h a r t s 
tnc appellants 
to accvpt the 
er 2. Division 
o:~ K. ode, sec-
re-sale certifi-
•o pr-sitv_«n to 
t::-r.s of that Ar-
:cr proviMons in 
o: :r«cor.c:stencv. 
[5] There are many situations which 
develop in the ordinary course of business 
where the purchaser is unable to determine 
at the time of the purcha.-e whether he 
will in fact resell the articles purchased or 
will use them. The resale certificate pro-
visions of the law were enacted to permit 
ently felt that it was fair to impose a tax-
on the purchaser under these conditions 
because the seller could have collected re-
imbursement for the tax from the buyer, 
except for his reliance upon the resale cer-
tificate. 
[6] The appellants, in the instant cases, 
both stored and fabricated the materials in 
California, pursuant to construction con-
tracts, they were not merely retaining 
these materials, demonstrating them or dis-
playing them while holding them for 
sale in the regular course of business. 
Furthermore, since all of these events took 
place in California and were preliminary 
to the actual shipment of the structures, 
there can be. in our opinion, no application 
of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the 
Federal Constitution. Son;hern Pacific Co. 
v. Gallagher. 5-> U.S. 167. 59 S.Ct. 38°. 
85 L.Ec. 5^6: Uiah Power & Light Co. 
v. Pfo?:. 286 U.S. 165, :-2 S.Ct. 5-48. 76 L. 
Ed. 103s: American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 
250 U.S. 45". 3*' SCt. '-22, 63 L.Ed. 1084. 
In other wordv the appellants cannot use 
the resale certificate- sections to strip the 
state of its jvriydiction merely because the 
ultimate and final use of the property took 
place in another state as pan of the con-
tir.umir process of contracting. 
Appellants funhcr contend that extrater-
ritorial effect is being given to the Califor-
nia Sales and Ucc Tax Law in these cases 
in that the contracting work was per-
formed outside of the state of California. 
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The actual erection of the structures was 
only a portion of the contracting agree-
ment. The agreement to erect the struc-
tures establishes the nature of the activi-
ties of the appellants as a contractor. How-
ever, all of the incidents with which the 
instant cases are concerned, insofar as they 
involve the applicability of the California 
Sales and Use Tax Law, are incidents 
which occurred in California. The prop-
erty was bought and delivered in California 
and a sales tax would have been paid but 
for the giving of the resale certificates; 
it was stored in California; it was deter-
mined that it would be dedicated to the per-
formance of a construction contract and it 
was removed from storage in California, 
then fabricated in California, that fabrica-
tion consisting of the rendering of con-
tracting services transforming the raw ma-
terials into the completed structures prior 
to their being shipped outside of the state 
for erection pursuant to the construction 
agreements. 
[7,8] Article 3, Chapter 2, Division 2 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code re'.atv-s 
entirely to resale certificates. The purpose 
of the provisions of sections 609:-6095 :s to 
relieve the original seDt-r from the payment 
of sales tax where the property is bought 
by the purchaser for the purpose of re-
selling it in the form of tangible personal 
property. Obviously, the legislature did 
not intend to permit parties in this type of 
transaction to escape payment of a ta>\ 
entirely by the giving of a resale certificate 
if it later developed that the property was 
consumed or used rather than resold in the 
form of tangible persona! property. To 
prevent this possibility, the legislature en-
acted section 6094. Once it is established 
that the property is not to be resold m the 
form of tangible personal property then the 
tax is due and payable since the sales tax 
was not priid at the time of the original 
sale The legislature has required that the 
purchaser must now pay the tax, but has 
related the tax back to the initial purchase 
to the extent that that purchase price is 
controlling as to the measure of the tax 
There is nothing in sections 6091-6095 tc 
indicate that the legislature intended in ar.;. 
way to relate these particular provision-
of law to problems dealing with intcrst:.* 
commerce. 
The appellants further argue that be-
cause the Board did not tax the sale of ma-
terials by the appellants in knocked-dov.r. 
form to be delivered without erection at th-_ 
out-of-state job sites, that the Board was 
inconsistent in taxing the materials fabri-
cated into structures in California pursu-
ant to a construction contract calling for 
erection of the structures in other states 
They further argue that in all cases thv> 
were merely selling personal property and 
should come within the Board's rule that 
gross receipts from sales to manufacturer-. 
producers or processors of tangible person:.' 
property which becomes an ingredient or 
component part of the tangible persona! 
property which they manufacture, procuc-. 
or process are not taxable. Where tbr 
appellants had no construction contract but 
were merely selling their materials to pur-
chasers out-of-state, they were reseihr.r 
personal property. But where they entcrt: 
into a construction contract to fabricate 
and erect structures on real property, tru; 
were essentially performing services. As 
to the construction contracts they were 
the consumers of the materials which the;, 
had purchased. They were not reselling 
these materials as personal property, but 
were rather using them in the process of 
fulfilling a construction contract, and thus 
fall within the provisions of Board rule NV 
11. 
Judgment afnrmed. 
WHITE, P. J., and DORAX, J., concur 
Hearing denied: SCHAUER and M;-
COMBJJ. , dissenting. 
MADSEN •. 
Ott M 7M tXd 
Richard D. MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, 
Boyd A. Swenaen and Beatrice Swen-
•en, Blaine Anderson and Sheree 
Anderson, Hope A. Hilton, Cynthia Hil-
ton, Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Heliand and 
the Middle East Foundation, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Mirvin D. BORTH1CK, W. Smoot Brim-
hall, and John Does 1 to V, being for-
mer Commissioners of the Utah De-
partment of Financial Institutions, De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 19704. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 12, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1989. 
Investors brought suit against former 
Commissioners of Department of Financial 
Institutions individually claiming their 
gross negligence resulted in loss of their 
investment. The Third District Court. Salt 
Lake Count}', David B. Dee, J., dismissed 
on grounds of res judicata. sovere>gn im-
munity, and statute of limitations. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.. 
held that. (1) res judicata was not applica-
ble: (2) Government Immunity Act did not 
apply; and (3) suit was not time barred due 
to extension of statute of limitations by 
dismissal of prior suit. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgment <s=>540 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action 
only if suit in which that cause of action is 
being asserted and prior suit satisfy three 
requirements: both cases involve same par-
ties or their privies, claim which is alleg-
edly barred must have been presented in 
first suit or must be one that could have 
and should have been raised there, and 
first suit must have resulted in final judg-
ment on the merits. 
BORTHICK Utah 245 
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2. Judgment **57(K4) 
Since trial court, in dismissing earlier 
action between investors and State Depart-
ment of Finance Commissioners officially, 
could not legitimately pass on merits of the 
complaint, because plaintiffs had failed to 
satisfy statutory notice requirements which 
were a precondition to suit, claim preclu-
sion did not prevent plaintiffs later suit 
against Commissioners individually. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b). 
3. Pretrial Procedure G=>554 
Dismissal of suit for "lack of jurisdic-
tion" for failure to comply with rules of 
civil procedure and court orders includes a 
dismissal for failure to meet a precondition 
to suit. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 41(b). 
4. Pretrial Procedure «=>554 
Plaintiffs failure to meet notice re-
quirements under Government Immunity-
Act was a failure to fulfill a precondition to 
suit, and thus dismissal of such action was 
for lack of jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953. 63-
30-11, 63-30-12; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
41(b). 
5. Judgment <s=>634 
Under rules of issue preclusion, adjudi-
cation of an issue bars its relitigation in 
another action if issue in both cases was 
identical, judgment was final with respect 
to that issue, issue was fully, fairly and 
competently litigated in first action, and 
party who is precluded from litigating the 
issue was either a party to the first action 
or a privy of party. 
6. Judgment <S=*702 
Since, under law applicable in 1980. 
State did not have a duty to indemnify 
Commissioners of Department of Financial 
Institutions in suit brought against them 
for activities arising out of their duties, but 
only had duty to defend them, plaintiffs 
were not required to file notice of claim 
against officers with State prior to bring-
ing suit against Commissioners individually 
under the Act: thus, prior dismissal of suit 
against Department and Commissioners of-
ficially did not have issue preclusive effect 
on later suit by same plaintiffs against the 
Commissioners individually. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-11, 63-30-12; U.C.A.1953. 63-48-2 
n 
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to 63-4M, 63-4&-2(2, 3), 6 W M ( W ) (Re-
pealed). 
7. Statutes *=>212.5 
Amendment to a statute is presumed 
to have intended to change existing legal 
rights. 
&. Statutes «=*206 
In interpreting statutes, Supreme 
Court had fundamental dut)' to give effect, 
if possible, to even' word of the statute. 
S. Officers and Public Employees c=>116 
Later amendment of Government Im-
munity Act. granting officials immunity 
even for gross negligence which arose in 
course of their duties was substantive 
change of law and did not retroactively 
apply and bar citizens' suit for officials' 
actions which predated amendment U.C. 
A.19S3, 63-30-1 et seq. 
10. Limitation of Actions <s=*230(5) 
Upon date of affirmation of dismissal 
of timely first action, statute of limitations 
was extended for one year in which to 
allow plaintiffs to file a second action. 
U.CA.1953. 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), 78-
12-29(2), 78-12-40. 
11. Limitation of Actions «»118(2) 
For purposes of determining timeliness 
of suit, suit is considered filed by filing of a 
criminal complaint or service of summons. 
not by filing of a notice of claim, where 
that notice is a precondition tc suit. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 3(a). 
Daniel F. Bertch, Robert J. Debry, Phillip 
B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Paul M. Warner. Ste-
phen J. Sorenson. Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants and appellees. 
ZIMMERMAN. Justice: 
Plaintiffs Richard D. and Nancy Madsen. 
Boyd A. and Beatrice Swensen, Blaine and 
Sheree Anderson, Hope A.. Cynthia, and 
Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Helland, and the 
Middle East Foundation, all investors in the 
1. For a more detailed account of the factual 
background of this case, see Madsen v. Bonhick, 
now-defunct Grove Finance Company ("the 
investors"), brought suit against defen-
dants Mirvin D. Borthick and W. Smoot 
Brimhall, former commissioners of the 
Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
("the Commissioners"). The investors seek 
to recover the amount of their lost invest-
ments from the Commissioners personally. 
The trial court granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of the Commissioners, basing 
its ruling on several alternative grounds. 
The court held that the doctrine of res 
judicata barred the action, that the Com-
missioners are immune from suit under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
that the applicable statute of limitations 
bars this action. The investors challenge 
all of these legal conclusions. We agree 
with the investors that the trial court's 
ruling was incorrect and reverse and re-
mand the matter for further proceedings. 
In Madsen i\ Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah 1983) [hereinafter Madsen 1). the 
plaintiffs in the instant case sued the State, 
its Department of Financial Institutions, 
and its Commissioner of Financial Institu-
tions, Mirvin D. Borthick. in his official 
capacity, claiming that they had lost most 
of their investment in Grove Finance when 
it became insolvent and that its insolvency 
was due to the defendants' failure to per-
form their statutory duties.1 658 P.2d at 
627-28. The trial court dismissed that case 
for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted" because the inves-
tors, in suing the State and state officers in 
their official capacities, had failed to file 
the statutorily required notice of claim 
within the allotted time. Id at 628; see 
Utah Code Ann §§ 63-30-1i, -12 (Supp. 
1979). This Court upheld that dismissal. 
658 P.2d at 633 
In our opinion in Madsen /, we indicated 
that one reason for affirming the trial 
court's dismissal was the investors' failure 
to sue Commissioner Borthick in his indi-
vidual capacity*. See id at 632-33. Absent 
an allegation that he had "acted or failed to 
act through gross negligence, fraud or mal-
653 P.2d 627, 62£-29 (Utah 2953) [hereinafter 
Madsen J]. 
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that this language should be ignored, that 
we should look instead to the 1983 amend-
ment of section 63-30-11, which deleted 
this language and had the effect of ex-
pressly requiring service of a notice of 
claim on the State in all suits against em-
ployees, whether or not any judgment 
might ultimately be payable by the State. 
They argue that the 1983 amendment was 
intended to clarify the earlier statute and 
to bring it into conformance with the legis-
lature's true intention in enacting the earli-
er version of the statute. 
[7,8] The Commissioners are correct in 
concluding that the effect of the 1983 dele 
tion of this language was to leave only the 
first paragraph of the section, which re-
quires that a notice of claim be filed with 
the State in all suits brought against state 
employees for actions taken in the course 
of their employment. We also agree that if 
the State has a statutory dun* to defend 
employees in all such suits and if the 
State's duty to indemnify is defined as en-
compassing its duty to defend employees, 
the statutory provisions relating to the no-
tice requirement and to indemnification are 
more coherent since the 19S3 amendment 
was made. However, we need not consider 
whether the legislature can properly char-
acterize the dun- to defend as a duty to 
indemnify, for we find no suggestion in 
sections S3-4c~2 through -4 that it intend-
ed to do so. Those provisions clearly state 
that there is no duty to indemnify by pay-
ing a judgment awarded in an action for 
11. The Commissioners have made no persuasive 
argument for disregarding the presumption thai 
an amendment is intended to change existing 
legal rights See 1A \ . Singer Sutherland on 
Statutory Construcnor § 22.30 (Sands 4th rev. 
ed 19S5). Furthermore, in asking us to rule 
that an entire sentence of the statute had abso-
lutely no meaning at ail. the> have ignored our 
fundamental duty to give effect, if possible to 
every word of the statute. See Totoncc v. 
Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175. 176. 397 P.2d 9S4, 9g7 
(1965); Stevenson v. Sal: Lake City, 7 Utah. 2d 
28. 31, 317 ?2d 597. 599 (1957); 2A N. Singer. 
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.06 
(Sands 4th rev. ed 19W). 
12. At the time this cause of action arose, section 
63-30-4 of the Code provided in pan as follows: 
The remedy agains: a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an act 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice—in oth-
er words, an action brought against an 
employee in an individual capacity. More-
over, the only possible import of the final 
sentence of the second paragraph of sec-
tion 63-30-11 is that there must be some 
suits brought under the Act against em-
ployees of which the State need not be 
notified. Unless we are to ignore that sen-
tence entirely, the 1980 version of section 
63-30-11 is more plainly read to expressly 
except from the notice of claim require-
ment suite against employees in their indi-
vidual capacities. If this were not enough 
to undermine the Commissioners' position, 
we find no indication in the 1983 amend-
ment or elsewhere that the amendment 
was intended to clarify a preexisting inten-
tion.11 For these reasons, we conclude that 
in 1980, section 63-30-11 did not require 
one suing state employees in their individu-
al capacities to file a notice of claim with 
the State. Therefore, the issue preclusion 
branch of the doctrine of res judicata can-
not support the summary judgment. 
[9] Having rejected res judicata as a 
basis for the summary judgment, we next 
consider the correctness of the trial court's 
ruling that the Commissioners are immune 
from suit under the Governmental Immuni-
ty Act. The investors point out that the 
Act, as it read at the time the cause of 
action arose in 1980. granted the Commis-
sioners no immunity from personal liability 
for gross negligence committed in their 
individual capacities.12 The Commission-
er omission which occurs during the perform-
ance of such employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of au-
thonry is, after the effective date of this act. 
exclusive of any other civil action or proceed-
ing by reason of the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the em-
ployee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or jailed to 
act through gross negligence, fraud, or mahce. 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental enury in a representa-
tive capacity if the act or omission com-
plained of is one for which the governmental 
entity may be liable, but no employee shall be 
held personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employ-
ment or under color of authority, unless it is 
